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INTRODUCTION
Trade

in agriculture has

accounted for about

Community

been a very important part of international

5% of the total

but although

it

trade.

has

It

exports of the United States and the European

consists of such a small percentage of their gross domestic

product there has been substantial protectionist policies by these two trading blocks

which have prevented the trade

in agricultural products to

trade has been restricted globally through

advance. The agricultural

numerous measures and schemes. These

are

designed to limit the importation of certain agricultural products into these trading blocks
while subsidizing through various schemes in order to increase and maintain their
respective

dominance

in

world agricultural markets. Measures

to restrict trade

have

included subsidies and the utilization of internal price support schemes which enable the

sale

of cheaper products on world markets. Also there

import licenses to
Europe. This

is

restrict the

done

is

the use of quota restrictions and

inflow of agricultural products into the United States and

in order to protect the respective

domestic industries from outside

competition.

Despite

all

these measures the United States in particular has seen a declining

agricultural sector while the

strengthened to

become

European Community has seen

its

market position

the premier market for products such as oilseeds and wheat.

Billions of dollars per year has been spent

sector and various Trade and

by the United States

to maintain its agricultural

Development Assistance programs promoting

its

exports

2

Although the United States has seen

are in place.

Europe

it

is still

its

market share decline compared to

a force to reckoned with in the field of agricultural production.

Continental Europe has on the other hand been the stronghold of agricultural

protectionism through
saturation of the

living for

restrict

its

its

Common Agricultural

European markets while

citizens.

Policy, designed to choke off any foreign

stabilizing

and promoting a better standard of

The European Community has various border measures

importation into the community, mostly adopted under the

Policy. This also consists of internal support measures

prices

where the community

commodity

is

sets

in place to

Common Agricultural

which include minimum producer

by regulation a minimum producer price

for

which a

almost always above world prices.

These protectionist policies have had a significant effect on developing countries.
Positively, as a result of all the subsidization there has

been cheaper imports into

developing countries especially those that are net food importing countries. However this
has also led to dependency and lack of initiative to attempt greater efficiency in
agricultural production.

Also heavy subsidization of products similarly produced by

developing countries has led to the domination of these products by the United States and

European Community. This has prevented developing countries from progressing

in the

export of agricultural products such as wheat, sugar and oilseeds.

The

trade policies of the United States and

Europe have had a significant

agricultural production of developing countries.

restrictions in their exports to

instances discrimination

Such countries have experienced

developed countries and

which breaches the principles

Agreement of Tariffs and Trade has occurred.

effect in the

in

some

laid

instances,

down

and

in other

in the General

3

In areas of production

where there

not subsidization

is

it is

observed that

multinational companies have heavily invested in developing countries not particularly

for the furtherance of these

economies but rather for corporate gains. Multinational

companies have and continue

to capitalize

on these countries' only means of exports and

thereby play a controlling role over their political, economic and social

The General Agreement on

Tariffs

and Trade promotes free trade but

it

years exploited the

Unites States farmers and strengthened

development of developing countries

its

is

economy.

was

same clauses designed

Among

originally

The European

contracted in the interest of the United States agricultural community.

Community has however over the

life.

to protect

several factors hindering

the protectionist activity of the United States and

Europe. Developing countries, particularly those that depend solely on agricultural
exports for their income, have not enjoyed unrestricted access to world markets and this

has contributed to their inability to sustain rapid growth rates.

have
in

felt that

the General

Agreement on

Tariffs

Many

developing countries

and Trade has not served

in their interest

terms of opening up the world markets of which the European and American markets

are the best established.

The purpose of my
Union and

thesis is to study the various protectionist policies of the

the United States and to ascertain

its

effect

on developing

countries.

European

The

focus of my thesis will be from the perspective of the Agreement of the World Trade
Organization. In the course of this thesis

advancement of trade

Agreement of
trade

I

in agriculture

Tariffs

I

will

deduce that protectionism has limited the

and the fundamental principles of the General

and Trade have often been disregarded. While

do not propose the abolition of all barriers

to trade since this

I

propose freer

would lead

to the

4

vulnerability of domestic markets and saturation of imports at the expense of domestic

production.

Compliance with the Agreement on Agriculture, put forward by the World Trade
Organization will lead to trade liberalization. Through the gradual relaxation of trade

barriers

world trade in agriculture will be increased. Developing countries would gain

more access

to

world markets thereby improving their capacity to trade

in agricultural

products which would increase their economic development. Trade will be expanded,
there will not be the need for so

much

protectionism,

GATT rules

thereby eliminating the various non -compliance of its principles.

will

be more effective

CHAPTER

A study

of Subsidies and the Conflict between Domestic

Agreement of

Principles of the General

Trade liberalization has been constrained due
the

1

European Community and the United

States.

As

and Trade.

Tariffs

to the pursuit

Programs and the

of protectionist policies by

a result, access to the major markets

of the world has been restricted and this has contributed to the lack of progress of global
trade in agriculture. Policies of developed countries have had the net effect of interfering
1

with the free flow of international trade in agricultural products. There has been

encouragement of insulation of domestic markets and producers by the European

Community and

the United States. Consequently domestic production in excess of

demand has been encouraged;
The products

market."

the surplus either stored or exported onto the international

are subsidized in order to help

markets and the effect of such policies
countries.

is

compete on the international

the curtailment of market access for third

3

This chapter discusses the nature of subsidies and the general principles of the

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. In analyzing the nature of subsidies

'Joseph A.
2

id at
3

McMahon.

Agricultural trade, protectionism

and the problems of development, 52 3

63

John Jackson. The World Trading System 122

st

1

I

ed (1989)

will

rd

ed 1995

6

explore

how the EC and US

organize their domestic laws in order to promote the

subsidization of agricultural products in taking advantage of

GATT deficiencies.

A. Analysis of Subsidies.

A subsidy

is

a grant of money

made by

any enterprise, work, or improvement

which

is

in

a government in the aid of the promoters of

which

the

government desires

to participate, or

considered a proper subject for government aid. because such purpose

is

likely

4

to

be of benefit to the public. The most difficult issue relates to the problem of

distinguishing between legitimate government activities on the one hand and trade

distortive subsidies

conditions prevail

on the

other.

when goods

The theory of efficiency

are

produced

at the

states that ideal

cheapest price.

~

economic

A subsidy tries to set

off price and production disadvantages and weaknesses and therefore distorts the

equilibrium by misallocating resources.

6

There are two types of subsidies, domestic and export subsidies.
granted to an industry on

7

all

of its production of a product. This

price to lower than that of the

same product of imports, and

import competition. Therefore the subsidy
favourable to consumers

9
.

An

is

protectionist

export subsidy by contrast

is

is

A domestic
done

3

6

is

to reduce the

effectively drive out the

.

lowering prices and thus

paid to an industry only on

products that are exported. Consequently goods tend to be sold abroad

4

subsidy

at

a price below

The Uruguay Round of Agreement Act 19 U.S.C sec 3571 (1994)
th
Phillip Brown, Modern Economics 4 ed (1984)

OECD Agricultural Policies,

7

Miguel Figuero, International
Reg. 48 (1993)
8

id
9

id

Markets and Trade: Monitoring and Outlook, OECD Paris ( 988) p94
Law and International Relations Cheek to Cheek, 19 N. C.J Intl. L & com.
1

7

that

of the goods sold

in the

domestic market. This distorts resource allocation by

inducing production and exportation that

An

export subsidy

is

is

otherwise uneconomic.

prohibited per se and a domestic subsidy

is

prohibited but

admissible in instances concerning substantial changes in economic conditions." They
are allowed but not encouraged.

program or practice

1

"

An

export subsidy

that increases the profitability

may

be defined as any government

of export sales but does not similarly

increase the profitability of sales for domestic consumption.

government payments

to manufacturers that are contingent

1

"

Examples include

upon export volume and

the

manipulation of market determined exchange rates to favor export sales or production for
export.

14

In addition to this there

for use in the production

is

the provision of goods or services by the government

of exports on more favorable terms than for use

in the

production of goods for domestic consumption and a variety of other practices.

Where

it

1?

can be determined that a product has been subsidized a government can

impose a countervailing duty on the subsidized good.

16

Government subsidies

be characterized as export subsidies are countervailable under

US

law only

if

that cannot

they

fall

within the statutory definition of a domestic subsidy. Virtually any type of government

program can confer a domestic subsidy

if

it

meets two

criteria

:

it

must be

sufficiently

targeted to a specific enterprise or group of enterprises or industries, and roughly

it

must

provide some opportunity or advantage to the targeted producers that would not

10

49
Hufbauer

id at

G

& J Erb, Subsidies

in International

Trade

st
1

ed 24 (1984)

12

id

"id
14

15

rd

John Jackson. Legal Problems of International Economic Relation, 3 ed. 149 (1995)
General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade Annex A to the Subsidies Code is an Illustrative

19U.S.C.A 1677(5) (A)
John Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relation, supra

Subsidies.

at

1

50

list

of Export

8

otherwise be available to them in the marketplace.
large group of industries,

17

The

agricultural sector constitutes of

which have been heavily subsidized.

finances a program to assist

potentially countervailable.

all

18

farmers in the country

US

who

If a national

government

require aid. the aid

law allows only a few adjustments

is

to the subsidy

calculation to reflect taxes or other charges paid to the government by the beneficiaries of

the subsidy program.

19

Offsets are allowed for application fees, deposits or similar

charges in connection with the subsidy program. But the countervailing duty laws will
not look beyond the government program under investigation to calculate net benefits.

B. Countervailing Duty

The Tariff Act of 1930
duties

Laws of the United

States

section 303" authorizes the Treasury Department to impose

on imported merchandise

to offset

any bounty or grant bestowed upon

it.

Between

1935 - 1994 there were 24 duties imposed. The Trade Act 1974 made changes to the
statute. It required the

months of the

Treasury Department to

filing date

of a petition and a

make

a preliminary decision within six

final decision

within twelve months. The

Trade Agreement Act 1979 implemented the Tokyo Round subsidies code under the
law. Investigations were transferred

from the Treasury Department

to the

US

Commerce

Department's International Trade Administration.""

'

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 U.N.T.S 187 art. VI:6
William T Archy, Affirmative Countervailing Duty Determination, 50 Fed. Reg. 25,097,25101 (1985)
Tangermann, Approaches to Export Subsidies: Disciplines for Export Subsidies in Primary and Non

Primary Products, 55 Subsidies and Countervailing Measures

1

12 (1989)

20

id
21

22

Tariff Act 1930 sec 303, 19 U.S.C 987

Agreement on

the Interpretation and Application of Article V,

Instruments and Selected Documents 56

(GATT)

XVI and XXIII of the GATT,

Basic

9

The Administration proposed a
were never formally adopted due

however regarded

set

of regulations for countervailing subsidies but they

to the

pendency of the Uruguay Round. They are

as a valuable statement of practice. Section 355.42"

J

provides that a

countervailable subsidy exists where the Secretary determines that:

a)

a program provides selective treatement to a product or firm and

b) a

program provides a countervailable benefit with respect

to the merchandise.

24

Section 355.43 provides that:

Export programs. Selective treatment, and a potential countervailable export
subsidy exists where the secretary determines that eligibility for or the amount of benefits
a)

under a program
b)

Where

is

tied to actual or anticipated export earnings.

exportation

is

only one of many eligibility criteria for benefits under a

program, the inclusion of exportation as a criteria shall not per se constitute selective
treatment within the meaning of paragraph *a'.

Domestic programs, Selective treatment and a potential countervailable domestic
subsidy exists where the Secretary determines that benefits under a program are provided
or are required to be provided in law or in fact, to a specific enterprise or industry or
c)

group of enterprises."^

In determining whether benefits are specific the Secretary will consider

among

other

things the following factors:

The extent to which a government acts to limit the availability of a program, the
number of enterprises, industries, or groups thereof that actively use the program. A
factor that will be looked at is whether there are dominant users of a program or whether
certain enterprises, industries or groups receive disproportionately larger benefits under

The extent to which a government exercises
6
under a program is also considered.

the program.
benefits

discretion in conferring

C. Analysis of Injury

Before a countervailing duty

may

and Trade, a country must determine

'

be imposed under the General Agreement of Tariffs
that imports

of subsidized merchandize have

Trade Agreement Act 1979 Department of Commerce, International Trade Commission, 54 Fed. Reg.

23366
24

id
25

id
26

id

10

caused material injury or threatened material injury to the domestic industry producing
the like product of that import and are materially retarding the establishment of a

domestic industry.

The investigation of injury

known

is

as the injury test.

is

The

conducted by the International Trade Commission and

injury test requires the

domestic industry that competes with the imports

ITC

at issue is

to

determine whether the

materially injured or

is

threatened with material injury by reason of the imports that were found to be subsidized

by the ITC." The procedure determines whether unfairly traded imports cause or threaten
material injury or retard the establishment of an industry. Consequently the application

of the injury

test requires

only two or three stages of analysis. The relevant domestic

industry must be defined so that the impact of imports on

it

can be assessed and the

domestic industry must be examined for signs of material injury or threats of such
•

•

injury.

29

A preliminary injury investigation occurs after a case has been filed but before

the

Department of Commerce has made a determination whether the alleged unfair practice
actually exists. In this preliminary investigation the International Trade

decides whether there

subsidization

Commission

is

is

a reasonable indication that the injury test can be satisfied.

27

28

30

30

If

determined to exist the parties return to the International Trade

for the final injury investigation.

Here the injury

stringently and the petitioner's standard of proof

United States

Commission

Law are

GATT Article VI,

is

test is applied

more

higher. Injury investigations under

not governed by the Administrative Procedure Act and they are

55 U.N.T.S

1

87

art

VI:6

Commission 50 Fed.reg. 25097, 25101
John Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations supra
Tarrif Act 1930 Section703, 733; 19 U.S.C sec 1677
International Trade

at

1

52

11

typically

much

formal structured than proceedings before

less

many

other federal

3

regulating agencies'

.

D. The Agricultural Policies of the

EC

and

US

dealing with Subsidization

In the United States, strong political support for farm

programs

a driving force

is

behind protectionism. Farm groups and agricultural industries have a powerful lobby in
congress and farm states have a strong voice in Congress. The
that rural agricultural states

representation with

US

Agricultural liberalization

is

especially subject to legislative opposition in

The

US

and

EC

are

removed However
.

if

any of these countries

protectionist policies than the other

,

The most common

that

is

31

32

price.

on

able to maintain

producers in that country stand to gain

have been used

33

to support agriculture are internal

price support in the United States

payment which pays farmers the difference between a
market

in the

if the restrictions

dramatically through increased exports and higher domestic prices.

The primary policy instruments

most

major players

General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade and they stand to benefit

price supports.

structured so

or California.

countries due to classic prisoner's dilemma.

more of its

is

such as North Dakota and Nebraska enjoy equal

New York

agricultural trade are

senate

is

the deficiency

legislated target price

There are also border restrictions such as

tariffs,

and the

quotas, restrictive

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C 701-706 (1966)

Miguel Montana-Mora, International Law and International relations Cheek to Cheek 19 N.C J lnt'1, L&
com. reg. 1, 12n.48(1993)
33
T.L Oyloe, US & EEC Agriculture 29 Span Progressive Agriculture 107, 108(1986)
Thomas L Schoenbaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A threat to the GATT and Global Free Trade, 24 St
Mary's L.J 1165, 1185(1993)

12

licensing measures and export subsidies.^

wheat feed
It

The United

grains, rice, dairy, tobacco, sugar, oilseeds honey,

must also be realized

that

US

programs subsidizing

States has

agricultural export gains

wool and peanuts.

have not kept pace with

increases in productivity. Export of farm products have remained relatively static since

1980.

The percentage of Americans employed

1975 to 1.6%

in 1993.

6

The

consumption or decreases
either purchase

US

in agriculture has

resulting surplus has not been

in imports. Instead the

unconsumed products

US

decreased from 6.7% in

met by increases

in

government has been forced

or pay for their storage.

Department of Agriculture has spent an average of 20

to

Over the past ten years the

billion dollars per year

on

agricultural programs.

The

resultant inefficiencies

study estimates that the

US

and economic distortions further exacerbate the

costs.

One

government spends over 80,000 dollars per year for each

farm job saved. Massive expenditures on agricultural support also

shift

resources from

unsubisdized to subsidized goods and from other sectors of the economy thereby
affecting labour

and land allocation. Price supports and guaranteed income programs

create incentives to use land for agriculture

On the

which may otherwise be put

26 billion dollars per year

trade liberalization and the United States could reduce

35

id at

38

other hand the benefits of trade liberalization are startling. Studies demonstrate

that developing countries stand to gain

dollars.

to other uses.

its

in real

trade deficit

income through

by 42

billion

39

1179

36

Abstract of the US Census Bureau, 395 (1994)
Budget of the United States Government, Historical Tables 40-42 (1995)
Thomas
Hertel, Economywide Effects of Unilateral Trade and Policy Liberalization
Agriculture, in Macroeconomic Consequences of Farm Support Policies 260, 261 (1989>
39
Jim Chen, The American Ideology, 48 Vand.L. Rev 809, 824 (1995J
Statistical

37

W

in the

US

13

Community an important

In the European

been the creation of the
the

Common Agricultural

European Community Treaty

Market for

40

among

member

the

Policy for

all

member

states.

the functioning and development of the

agricultural products shall be

agricultural policy

feature of agricultural subsidization has

According

Common

accompanied by the establishment of a

states.

The objectives of the

to

common

Common Agricultural

Policy are:

To

a)

increase agricultural productivity by developing technical progress and by ensuring

development of agricultural production and the optimum

the rational

utilization

of the

factors of production in particular labour;

To ensure thereby

b)

a fair standard of living for the agricultural community: particularly

by the increasing of the individual earnings of persons engaged
c)

d)
e)

To stabilize markets;
To guarantee regular supplies; and
To ensure that supplies reach consumers

The

Common Agricultural

at

in agriculture;

reasonable prices.

Policy has had dramatic success in increasing agricultural

productivity and assuring the availability of supplies. Although in the
basically a food importer zone, today the

EC

is

1

960s Europe was

the second largest exporter of farm

products in the world. The scheme based on the use of variable levies to prevent imports

and exports refunds
time

is

when

it

was a

to foster exports

It is

to

be very successful for the Community

net importer of farm products.

designed to look like a

barrier.

proved

tariff duty,

41

The

variable levy

a constantly adjusted tariff duty usually calculated based on the difference

Common

EC
41

was established under
Economic Community.
298 U.N.T.S 1 1, 30

Agricultural Policy

establishing the European

Treaty Article 39 (4)

.

Graham Avery, The Common

Agricultural Policy:

481,482(1984)
42
Alan Charles Raul, Global Trade

the Treaty of

Rome

42

price.

establishing the European

A Turning Point 21 Common Mkt.L.Rev,

in Agricultural Products,

a

a mechanism that

but which effectively, operates as a non-tariff

between a desired domestic market price and the lowest world market

The

is

at

147 PLI Order No. A4-4276

.

14

Nonetheless the effects of this scheme on world markets has given

number of disputes between

Community became

the

community and

the

4j

for having stolen

protectionist measures

between the

issue of the bilateral relationships

its

EC

markets.

and the

is

much

US

between the two blocks.

between the

EC

US

has ensued becoming the most thorny

was

44

the inclusion of agriculture within
4?

Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.

irreconcilable differences

discussed the

A war of subsidies and other

A first step directed at restoring this credibility
the agenda of the

number of US

Although the causal relationship between the EC's

growing exports and the corresponding decline of US exports

EC

growing

US. During the 1980s the

a net exporter of agricultural products while a record

farmers were filing for bankruptcy

has blamed the

rise to a

and the

US

in

However

the

connection with the reduction of

public support to farmers has stalled the talks, leading the negotiations to a halt.

E.

The

GATT rules on agriculture

The

GATT rules dealing with agriculture were drafted

farmers.

When the GATT was being

formulated the

US

to suit the interests

of US

insisted that a provision should

be included which would permit the retention of quantitative restrictions related to the

enforcement of domestic agricultural programs.
concessions to extend

all

46

Due

to insufficient international

of the rules governing trade in manufactured goods to trade in

agricultural products, exceptions

were carved out so

that the

new

rules

and disciplines

43

id
et de Development Economiques,
Cee 161 (1987)

Organization de Cooperation
Agricoles: Etude Sur la
45

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 33 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents

hereinafter
46

Politiques Nationales et

Echanges

GATT

BISD

Kenneth W. Dam, The GATT:

Law and

International

Economic Organization

st
1

ed 10 (1970)

19 (1987)
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would not apply with
therefore written to

full

fit

force in the area of agriculture.

The

GATT rules were

the agricultural programs then in existence especially in the United

48

States.

For a number of reasons, agriculture has traditionally been a sector protected by most
governments. In the 1930s some western countries namely the United Kingdom. France

and Germany intervened heavily
of the mid 1920s. The

crisis

this period relying heavily

and export subsidies.

US

markets to protect their farmers from the

in agricultural

also laid the foundations for

its

agricultural policies in

on import quotas, production control programs

.

price supports

49

The regime established by the

GATT in

1947

rests

on four general

principles: a) trade

ought be based on nondiscrimination and most favoured nation treatment, b) that non
tariff barriers

should be eliminated, and

c) that the

GATT contracting parties

should

adhere to bound duty rates and meet from time to time to negotiate the reduction of tariffs

and that disputes over trade should be
of the

GATT provides in part

by any contracting party
shall

to

"

settled primarily

any advantage

any product originating

all

particular item

49

form

all

other

in or destined for

any other country

GATT member country

GATT members."

1

General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade, Article XI, 55 U.N.T.S 187 art XI: 2
Dale E Hathaway, Agriculture and the GATT : Rewriting the Rules 104(1987)

4

GATT,

Basic Instruments and Selected Documents

at 1;61,

T.I.A.S,

No

1700

50

id
5/

General Agreement to Tariffs and Trade Article

1.

1

immunity granted

,

other contracting parties". This article provides for the

uniformity in the tariff duties imposed by a

48

Article

be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or

destined for the territories of

47

50

privilege or

favour

,

through consultation.

55 U.N.T.S

at

641(1987)

on

all

imports of a

16

Article

GATT

XI of the

"No

provides in part

codifies the prohibition

on non

tariff barriers to trade.

prohibitions or restrictions other than duties

whether made effective through quotas

,

,

It

taxes or other charges

imports or export licenses shall be instituted or

maintained by any contracting party". Article XI provides for the general elimination of
quantitative restrictions. According to paragraph one of Article

restrictions other than duties, taxes or other charges,

XI

"

No

prohibitions or

whether made effective through

quotas, import or export licenses or other measures shall be instituted or maintained by

any contracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any other
contracting party"."

2

To

the general prohibition on quantitative restrictions there

immediate exception applicable to agricultural products. According
import restrictions

may

be allowed

if

governmental measures which aims
a) restrict the

an

paragraph two,

they are necessary to the enforcement of any

to:

markets or production of a like domestic product; or

substantial domestic production

to

is

of the

like

if there is

no

product of a domestic product for which the

imported product can be directly substituted;"^ or

remove a temporary surplus of a like or directly substitutable product by making it
4
available to certain consumers either free or below the current price;"*' or
c) to restrict the quantities permitted to be produced of any animal production where that
production is directly dependant on the imported product, if domestic production of that
b) to

product

is

small.

To prevent

restrictions

contracting party

of either the

under these exceptions from being protectionist, any

who wishes to impose

total quantity or the

quantitative restrictions

value of the permitted imports of the specified product.

Contracting Parties have however found their

J

"

p.
53

54

must give public notice

way around

3

these articles through illegal

General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade Article XI, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents, vol, IV,
1

Geneva (1969)

id at art XI:2(a)

id at art XI:2(b)
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quantitative restrictions. This takes the

or Orderly Marketing arrangements.

form of Voluntary Export Restraint agreements

They provide a

level

of access for a particular

country and once imports have reached this level further imports are excluded. In return

for this level

of access the exporting countries usually agree not to export beyond the

individual quota for the importing country.

producers.

to avoid the use

it

domestic

deals with exports of products with the assistance of subsidies. In relation

to export subsidies for agricultural products

granted

to protect

36

XVI

Article

Such measures help

it

declares that contracting parties shall seek

of subsidies on the export of primary products.

shall not

3

If however a subsidy is

be applied in a manner which results in the party having more than an

equitable share of world export trade in that product because there are no statistical
definitions of an equitable share in world markets."

exploited. This

bypass the

is

due

to the

GATT rules

vagueness of the

article

The provision

in this sense

can be

and therefore contracting parties

and impose on other contracting parties measures which are

contrary to the law and spirit of the

GATT. There

is

between

therefore a conflict

domestic agricultural programs on the one hand and the law of GATT on the other."

GATT prohibits export
that accepted Article

*
56

57
58

9

subsidies of non primary products for those contracting parties

XVI(4).

60

id

Miguel Antonio Figuero, The GATT and Agriculture: Past, Present and Future 5 Kan.J.L& Pub.Pol'y 93
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 55 U.N.T.S 187art XVI
Jona Filipek, Agriculture ina World of Comparative Advantage 30 Harv.Int. L J 123,135 (1989)

59

id

On November

19, 1960 Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark France Germany, Italy Luxemborg, the
Norway Switzerland the U.K, and the United States signed a declaration giving effect to
XVI(4). E Bruce Butler, Countervailing Duties and Export Subsidization 9 Va Int .82, 91 (1968)

Netherlands,
article

,

,

,

,

,

.
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With regard
ambiguous and

to

primary products the review session produced one of the most

criticized articles

of the General Agreement Article XVI(3)

to this provision the contracting parties should seek to

:

.

According

avoid the use of subsidies on the

export of primary products. The article provides that "if a contracting party does grant
subsidies that operate to increase the export of any primary product from

such subsidy shall not be applied in a manner which results

GATTArt.XVI(3)

territory

in that contracting party

having more than an equitable share of world export trade in that product.

61

its

,

CHAPTER 2
An

Analysis of Protectionist Measures of the United States and European

Community

The Worldwide

agricultural subsidies plus the cost to

consumers resulting from

protectionist policies total about 150 billion dollars a year

Multilateral trade negotiations offered a

means

".

The Uruguay round of

to reduce these costs

and

to

enhance the

economic well being of agriculture.
In the addess

States

by Clayton Yeutter. the Former Secretary of Agriculture

to the

Feed and Grain Council he stated that many governments continue

United

to protect their

domestic farmers with border measures which discourage or prevent import competition

from many commodities. This has led

whose consequence

is

that

to

an international system of competing subsidies

poor nations unable

to

match the subsidies of their trading

partners are denied any realistic hope of agricultural development.

Due

to the lack

of enforcement

in the

4

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

it

has

been necessary for contracting parties themselves to tackle the reduction of protectionist
activities in order for

chapter

"

I

GATT to effectively

will detail the various

encourage global trade

in agriculture. In this

forms of protectionist policies which have been

B.T Oleson, Linkage of Agricultural Policy and Long Term Prospects

in Agriculture,

32 Can.

in place

J.

Econ. Rev 198(1985)
63

64

Mark Drabenstolt, Farm Policy Econ. Rev. Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Publication (1989)
Address by Clayton Yeutter to the US Feed Grains Council Meeting. Aug 7, 1989.
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Agric.

20

markets.

I

will also explore the disadvantages of these policies

which have been made

The main

in

an effort to meet the

policies used

and the various reforms

GATT obligations.

by the United States and the European Community have been

domestic farm subsidies, agricultural export subsidies and barriers to agricultural imports.

These policies have been developed to
market prices.

assist farmers

maintain farm income, stabilize and

3

Each of these forms of protection has

on domestic and international markets.

effects

Domestic farm subsidies stimulate surplus production, which creates

structural

imbalances in world markets. Export subsidies allow exporters to penetrate foreign

markets by selling

at less

States created the Export

than their cost of production. Beginning in 1985. the United

Enhancement Program

to

the Department of Agriculture pays cash bonuses to

between

US

domestic price and world prices.

66

compete with the EC. Under the

US

EEP

exporters equal to the difference

Both domestic and export subsidies

promote production efficiency and undermine the theory of comparative advantage.
In addition import barriers serve to insulate

competition.

67

all

or part of a domestic market

The US maintains import quotas on various

from import

agricultural products including

sugar and peanuts under Section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act.

In 1992

US

import quotas on sugar increased the price of sugar to twenty two cents per pound or

65
6

Fred Bersten

,

Reforming World Agricultural Trade, World Agriculture Trade ed

Export Enhancement Program, implemented under the authority of the

CCC

3 (1988)

Charter,

Food Security Act

sec 1127(1985)
rd

John H Jackson, legal problems in international law and economic relations 3 ed 158 (1995)
Dale Hathaway, The Global Food Regime in Multilateral Negotiations, 1 Transnat'L L & Contemp.
Probs. 393, 404(1 99 \)

21

about twice the world price. Moreover this program of support costs
3 billion dollars per year in

Generally the
for agricultural

as a constraint

US

high grocery

consumers about

bills.

has been able to exert great influence over the international market

commodities since the

1

970s.

US

domestic agricultural policy functions

on other agriculture exporting nations, especially those

countries where trade tends to be agriculture dependent. Generally

its

US

US

in the

developing

farm policy offers

farmers supplementary income through a variety of mechanisms to compensate for

domestic and international market forces that would not otherwise provide sufficient

income

to justify continued production.

for certain agricultural products.

and markets

in

US

Because

US

exports dominate the world market

farm policy has the potential

to

shape internal policy

developing countries, as well as export options and earnings power for
70

their agricultural sectors.

A. United States Agricultural Production

The United

States

commodities. The

US

is

a leading producer and exporter of major world food

produces about half of the world's corn and soybeans, and

US

export comprise about sixty eight per cent of the World's total corn exports and almost

seventy three percent of the worlds total soybean exports. In wheat although the United
States produces only ten

and one half percent of the world

total,

US

exports

make up

almost forty one percent of total world exports. Similarly, in cotton the United States

produces seventeen percent of total world production but supplies twenty eight percent of

Monahan, US sugar policy: Domestic and International Repurcussions of Sour law, 15
& comp I. rev 325, 343 (1992)
70
D. Gale Johnson, Agricultural Policy and Trade: Adjusting domestic programs in an international
framework 1 ed 19(1985)
{Catherine

Hastings

int'l

st

71

the world exports. In rice,

where domestic production

is

only one per cent of total world

production the high export rate of domestic rice leads to an eighteen percent share of total

world exports. Only

Average

US

in sugar is the

US

only two percent of world market.

production and export of targeted commodities 1987-1989

COMMODITY
OF WORLD

PI
AS
US PRODUCTION

% OF

WORL D PRODUCTION
WOP

US EXPORTS AS

52.4

67.8

COTTON

17.2

28.4

RICE

1.4

18.6

SOYBEANS

48.3

72.7

SUGAR

5.9

WHEAT

10.5

USDA Agricultural

B. United States

%

EXPORTS

CORN

FNSource:

71

2.2

40.6

Statistics.

1990.

Farm Policy

United States Farm Policy focuses today less on farm incomes directly and more on

improving the

US

trade balance through expansion of exports in one of the

productive sectors of the domestic economy.
trade based

programs

to support

*"

The United

States has long

most

employed

farm incomes. The Agricultural Trade Development

And

~
;

T.
72

L Oyloe. U.S and E.E.C Agricultural 29 Span

A.J Webb, World Agricultural Markets and U.S

Department of Agriculture (1985)

:

Progressive Agriculture 107.108 (1986)

Farm

Policy, published in Agricultural Economics:

US
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Assistance Act was passed to dispose of surplus agricultural commodities and promote
the stability of domestic agriculture.

It

provided for sales of food commodities

prices to developing countries at highly conccesionary terms, in

repayment as well as

to forty years for

the

program accounted

for outright grants

for a large share

of

US

some

of food

aid.

at

market

cases granting up

During the

1

960s

agricultural exports but has declined in

importance in since the 1980s.

The

effect has

been that Food Aid has been particularly controversial because of its

mixed and uncertain
in

effects

on development.

It

has been denounced for causing a decline

developing countries' local food prices through increased supply, thus discouraging

production, stifling development and increasing the long term need for food.
other hand food provided through the

commitment of resources
industrial

development.

The declining

role

PL480 program may have made

sells to

of PL480 food aid program was precipitated by the passage of

73

id at
74
75

US

made on

The Export Credit

government guarantees of repayment

credit.

Through

this

buyer defaults. The program

is

to its exporters

program when a domestic producer

a foreign buyers, the government guarantees

that the foreign

possible a stronger

75

Guarantee Program gives the
export sales are

the

developing countries, thus spurring

to the industrial sectors in

additional export focused legislation to increase commercial sales.

when

On

payment

to the

producer in the event

designed to reduce the risk of export sales

701

E.C Pasour Jr,
Agric.64(1988)

5I

ed 43 (1991)
Food A id? A Comment in Agriculture and the State
The Farm Problem, Government Farm Programs and Commercial Agriculture,

Walter P Falcon, Whither

1

J.

Prod.
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US

for

exporters.

Domestic producers then may

US

lower prices than they could

if

government.

their

buyer was not backed by the

C.

The Burden of Domestic Farm Programs
Domestic farm programs have caused

approximately two million farms.

sell at

US

in the

structural

Of these two

changes in the US. There are

about 1.6 million are smaller farms which

gross between 1.000 and 40.000 dollars per year. These farmers receive

little

government

support and do rely on farm revenues as their primary source of income. The average

annual farm income for this group of farmers
their off

farm income

is

about

1

1,200.

is

about $8,100 subsidies included, while

Most US government deficiency payments

received by large relatively wealthy farm enterprises.

Farm

subsidization overwhelmingly

flows to about 363.000 farmers on the high end of the income scale
cent of all farm subsidies.

are

who

receive 30 per

77

D. Effects of Trade Liberalization

Though domestic farm jobs

will be lost,

employment

in

manufacturing will increase

through investment of savings gained through reallocation of resources away from
78

agriculture.

goods

will adjust

resources

in

Without pressure from subsidized products the market price for agricultural

upward and global demand

away from

agricultural production.

developed countries they will

shift

will rise as developed countries shift their

As

resources

toward agriculture

in

move away from

agriculture

developing countries.

Increased agricultural production and exports in developing countries will yield

76

id

more

25

foreign exchange earnings, which will be available to purchase imports or repay debt.

Higher trade volume will

facilitate

reduction of imports tariffs and export taxes, which

will reduce distortions in domestic allocation

Again these adjustment

will

of resources between agriculture industry.

promote higher demand

for imports of industrial

goods

in

developing countries as the developed countries are looking to export more of these
goods, and greater supply of agricultural goods for export from developing countries as

demand

increases in the developing countries.

E. Border

80

Measures of the European Community

Virtually

all

trading nations utilize

some form of border

some

restrictions to protect

sector of domestic farming. Protectionist border measures include the use of prohibitive

tariffs,

quantitative restrictions, variable duty rates and restrictive import licensing.
Q

1

unnecessary technical standards or unreasonable health and safety requirements.

One of the most

effective forms of border restriction used

by the

EC

has been the

variable levy system to limit imports of most major agricultural commodities.

the

CAP

the

EC

production of

its

has managed to

restrict

import competition and to induce increased

major agricultural items. The variable levy

designed to look like a tariff duty"

.

Through

is

a

mechanism

that is

but effectively operates as a non tariff barrier.

82
It is

usually calculated based on the difference between a desired domestic market price and
the lowest world market price.

Changes

in

world price are automatically reflected

William Dullforce. America's Farm Subsidies, The Economist June 27. 1992 at 21.
Alan Deardoff. Options for Trade Liberalization: Role of the US 17. 23 Frank J Macchiarola ed (1990)
Thomas Loo & Edward Tower. Agricultural Protectionism and the Less Developed Countries.
.

8

_

80

Fred Berasten. Reforming World Agricultural Trade 3

rd

ed 87 (1988)

8

id
!
8:

in the

Kenneth Dam. The European

Common

Market

in

Agriculture. 67 Col. L. Rev 209. 217 (1967)
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amount of the

levy.

As

imported goods rises

,

the price of import competition declines the levy applied to

thus guaranteeing that domestic production, however high the

price, will maintain a competitive

advantages over imports. The European Commission

calculates import levies for each grain

in conjunction with various types

on a daily

8j

basis.

The variable levy has been used

of internal subsidies to expand the EC's dairy

feed grains sectors with dramatic results.

The

CAP

for dairy

begun

,

beef and

in 1962. resulted in

huge production and surpluses of skim milk powder and butter during the 1970s which
continued during most of this decade. These surpluses have only been recently arrested

by

drastic

changes in the program. Similarly the

grains has transformed the

significant surpluses.

variable levy

is

a key

production in the
the

Community

F. Price

EC

EC

Common Agricultural

from a large importer of feed grains

plain, therefore that the result

It is

of the

to net exporter with

CAP

component has been

to induce ever increasing

and

most of that production

to guarantee that

Policy for feed

system of which the

amounts of

is

purchased within

thereby displacing imported goods.

Support System of the

CAP

Implementation of a system of guaranteed prices keeps market prices
for the benefit of Europe' s farmers.

he

is

The EC farmer has incentive

assured a guaranteed price per unit of his commodity. The

support

is

also protected

products, the

CAP

J

from being undermined by imports.

assigns a

minimum

86

to over

CAP

artificially

high

produce because

system of price

To imported

agricultural

import price called the threshold price which

B.T Oleson, Linkage of agricultural policy and long term prospects in the International Grain Trade, 32
Can Agric.Econ Rev,186, 198 (1985)
8
^ Bale and Koester, Maginot Lime of European Farm Policies 6 The World Economy 373, 379 (1983)
85
America's Farm Subsidies, The economist, June 27,1992 at 21
.
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constitutes the

minimum

Community's external

entry price for imports from
87

frontiers.

The threshold

price for imported commodities will be the

agricultural products

88
.

It is

maintained

the target price by subtracting

from the

at

price

same

non

is

states applicable at the

calculated so that the selling

is

as the target price for

community priced

a level to prevent imports from undercutting

target price an

amount which takes

the internal distribution costs of transport and unloading

This

EC

into account

from the point of entry.

enforced so that European farmers are guaranteed a floor below which prices will
90

not

fall.

If the internal

come

market price

into operation, but the

Products

may

in the

minimum

price level, intervention

mechanisms

form of intervention depends on the particular product.

either be temporarily or

by intervention agencies.
goods

falls to the

permanently withdrawn from the internal market

When market

market or export them.

price increases the agencies

may

re-introduce the

'

G. Co-responsibility Levies

As budgetary

outlays for the

responsibility levies

CAP

continued to grow the

devised a system of co-

which are payments made by Europe's farmers

Community, based on

either a fixed rate

Alan Barkema, Agriculture and the

GATT, A

directly to the

of the price they receive or on a variable rate

according to the volume of commodity involved.

86

EC

"

The

original goal of this instrument

time for change Econ. Rev. Fed 21 (1989)

87

id
88

id
89

Coopers and Lybrand, Agriculture EC Commentaries, Oct 15, 1992
John S Markle, Slaying the sacred cow: Looking for Concensus in the Reforming of World agricultural
Trade, 68 N.D. L Rev. 607, 61 1 (1992)

91

id

John Marsh, The
Future. 1989

Common Agricultural Policy,

in the

European Community and the Challenge of the
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was

to reduce prices to farmers, raise

revenue for the community and leave consumer

prices unchanged.

The

price support systems have been so successful that structural surpluses have been

created in several products.

As

a result measures have been introduced to limit over

production within the community. In 1988 substantial reform in agricultural policy finally
occurred
cut the

when

EC

the

European Council agreed

guaranteed price for a commodity

have

Stabilizers

production.

now become

The premise

is

to introduce stabilizers that automatically

if

agreed production levels are exceeded.

an integral part of the Community's effort to curb

that a co-responsibility levy is

each marketing year and will only be reimbursed

if the

charged

maximum

at the

beginning of

guaranteed quantity

is

not exceeded.

H. The Oilseeds Dispute

The various

limitations of access to markets

and protection of domestic markets

undoubtedly lead to trade disputes of which the most

US

between the

and

oilseeds from the

EC

Consequently, the
the

US would

EC

over oilseeds. In 1962 the

during the Dillon

US

Basile,

US

like to see continue.

its

Round of Multilateral Trade

EC

duty

Negotiations.

free, a practice

94

which

The zero binding was granted because Europe needed

rapidly expanding

meat

sector,

and the US, the world's

The General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade, the European Economic Community and

Agriculture, Tul. L. J 1993
94

and protracted has been

secured a zero duty binding for

export of oilseeds could enter the

protein feed components for

Eva

bitter

GATT Panel

Ruling on Oilseeds. B.I.S.D 37

th

Supp.86- 132 (1991)
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largest

producer of such products, was the EC's principle supplier of oilseeds and oilseeds

products.

Four years

later the

Community

desiring to bring the oilseed sector under

CAP,

formulated a system of minimum producer prices and a system of subsidies for oilseed
processors to ensure that preference were given to domestically produced oilseeds.

Initially the

impact on

US

producers was minimal but by 1987 the US's anxiety over the

use of domestic subsidies by the
duty binding had peaked.
In 1987 the

Community

to erode the advantage

of the 1962 zero

96

American Soybean Association

filed a section

301 petition with the

United States Trade Representatives as permitted by the United States Omnibus Trade

and Competitiveness Act. This alleged among other things that the EC's
practices concerning oilseeds

GATT

were denying the rights

and were imposing a burden on

that subsidy

payments made

to

oilseeds violated Article 111:4.

consultations with the

EC

negotiations failed and the

US

upon

The Claim was

commerce.

EC

oilseeds, but not foreign

by Article XXVIII of the

requested that the

oilseed subsidies impaired benefits accruing to the

to the

later initiated

GATT. Those

GATT Council of Representatives

The newly established panel found

on oilseeds granted by the Community

and

United States under

USTR initiated an investigation and

as required

establish a dispute settlement panel.

95

US

processors for processing

The

community

restriction

allotted to the

acts, policies

US

that the

under the duty free

tariff

EC's
bindings

US."

Thomas J Schoembaum, Agricultural Trade Wars: A threat to GATT and Global Free Trade, 24 ST.
Mary's L.J. 1195(1993)
96
Alan Raul and Kevin Brosch, Global Trade in Agricultural products 5 1 Practicing Law Institute 1989
9~
International Trade Commission, 57 Fed. Reg 53, 801 (1992)
m
""
Gatt Panel Ruling on Oilseed Dispute B.I.S.D 37 Supp, 86-132 (1991)
99

id

30

EC

In 1990 the

direct

payments

recommended

Council of Ministers adopted a

to producers

by either modifying

its

XXVIII of the GATT.

Community

it

The

US

was not amenable

sought compensation under

impose punitive

tariffs

on a

billion dollars

XXVIII and

later refused to

After seven years the Blair

tariff

concessions for

100

the

USTR threatened to

worth of EC agricultural products into the US.

The Community only offered the

compensation and

EC

GATT Council meeting the

to either action.

a figure equivalent to the burden or restriction imposed

oilseed subsidies.

to

expeditiously to remove the impairment

In 1992 at a

article

scheme linked

GATT Panel

oilseeds support system or renegotiating

oilseeds under Article

indicated

oilseed subsidy

based on a per hectare basis. The

Community move more

that the

new

US

US commerce

upon

400 million

.

EC

dollars in

submit the dispute to binding arbitration.

House Agreement was signed

by

First the

101

Community

agreed to permanently limit the level of subsidized oilseed production and in exchange
the

US

withdrew

its

threat to

agricultural subsidies, the

Subsidies on

level

all

impose 200 per cent punitive

tariffs.

Second,

it

dealt with

main stumbling block of the Uruguay Round. Domestic

agricultural products will be reduced

by

20%

based upon the average

of production as determined by the Aggregate Measure of Support. While the

curtailed level of domestic subsidies did not necessitate the granting of concessions

the

community

this

On December

was not

14,

true as far as export subsidies

1989 the

GATT Panel released

its

were concerned.

report finding that

by

102

community

regulations providing for payments to seed processors conditional on the purchase of

100

id at

801(1992)

Dilip Das.

GATT Complaints

Trade L. (1984)

between the United States and the European Community, 18

J.

World
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oilseeds originating in the

Agreement

1(b
.

According

less favourable than that

community

are inconsistent with .Article

to

affecting their internal purchase. The

domestic products. This applies to

GATT

Panel

recommended

US

under Article

1 1

of the General Agreement

binding for oilseeds were impaired.

1(b

all

that the

bring these regulations into conformity with the General agreement.

accruing to the

of the General

imported products shall be given treatment no

to this article

accorded

III

104

regulations

community

Secondly, benefits

in respect

of the zero

tariff

This resulted from the introduction of production

subsidy schemes which operate to protect community producers of oilseeds. Tollowing
the release of the report the

the

GATT panel's

EC

foreign affairs council expressed

Another trade dispute resolved
of sugar and the claim was
price support

readiness to accept

conclusions and to adapt the community regulation within the

framework of the implementation of the

EC's

its

program

filed

results

earlier

was

of the Uruguay round.

t

the dispute regarding the subsidized export

by Brazil and Australia. In the Sugar Subsidy Case the

for sugar held the domestic price

of EC sugar well above

world market prices. The high support price stimulated production above the level of
domestic consumption creating a surplus that had to be exported each year. The high
domestic price necessitated a substantial export subsidy in order to meet world prices. At
times the subsidy amounted to twice the world price.

J

~

USDA

Statement of US

-

EC Accord

107

The EC share of the world

on Oilseeds and the Uruguay Round. 9

Int'l

Trade Rep 2028

(1992)
103

GATT Panel

Ruling on Oilseeds Dispute B.I.S.D 37

th

Supp: 86-132 (1991)

lw
id
105

id
106

J Schoembaum. Agricultural Trade Wars: A threat to GATT and Global Free Trade 24 ST.
Mary's LJ 1195(1993)
107
The GATT Panel Report on the Sugar Case. GATT BISD 26 th Supp 290 (1980)

Thomas
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market had risen from 8.8 per cent prior to 1976 to 14.3 per cent
increase in the

EC

Reform of the

I.

As
the

This 75 per cent

in 1978.

108

market share had been achieved through the use of export subsidy.

Common

Agricultural Policy

a result of the dispute and the negative effects of the

European Commission decided

to

reform

successful but there were several drawbacks.

The

it.

By

CAP

Common Agricultural

Policy

had been overwhelmingly

boosting output too successfully

it

had

generated surpluses that were costly to store. It infuriated farmers too by not propping up

their

income

that the

CAP

as

much

as they

would

109

like.

skyrocketing. Annual

of all

of the

the

mid 1980s policy makers

desperately needed reform due to changes in the European

failure to achieve the policy's stated goals.

56%

By

EC

Farm

The

cost of the agricultural

realized

economy and

the

program was

subsidies cost approximately 46 billion in 1992, representing

spending for the year. In 1991 the

CAP would exceed the

EC Commission

estimated that the cost

budget ceiling of approximately 39 billion

110

dollars.

During the 1980s the imbalance between supply and demand caused a buildup of
surpluses and a heavy drain on the EC's budget.

The movement

for reform

issuance of a Green Paper."

'

of the

It

CAP began

as early as 1985 with

reported that the

CAP

Commission's

has failed to provide adequate

support for farmers because the existing system did not take adequate account of the

incomes of the vast majority of small and medium

enormous income

Robert E. Hudec
109

,

disparity

The

among

size family farms. This

farmers in various

GATT Legal System

member

states

and World Trade Diplomacy 2

Vernon Runngen, Economic Implication of Agricultural Policy Reforms

nd

had resulted

and within the

ed 141 (1990)

in Industrial

Market Economics

st

ed 30 (1989)
no
Rudi Gotzen
1

EC

in

Perspective of Production Subsidies and Control 37 Drake .L.Rev 234 (1987)

member

1

12

states.

surplus sectors by

The Commission decided

that progressive reductions in production

price policy reflecting market

means of a

of

demand should be engaged.

This should take into account the income problems of small family farms in a more
effective

and systematic manner, supporting agriculture

in areas

where

is

it

indispensable

while maintaining social balance and protecting the environment.
In

May

1992 the

EC

adopted reforms of which the main thrust has been to switch

from a price support policy

same time taking account

to

one geared more towards

also of

development of rural areas"

4
.

direct aid for producers, at the

growing concerns over the

social

The reforms were phased over

and economic

a three year period, the

goals of which are a better balance of agricultural markets, both through
control of production and through keener efforts to stimulate

was

to

make more

demand.

l

~

more

effective

Another goal

competitive. European agricultural products on the domestic and

international markets

was

to

be achieved through substantial price reductions.

In an attempt to control the markets.

when making adjustments

to the

European

CAP:

legislators focused

on four objectives

control of production and expenditure, reduction

of stocks, preservation of the European pattern of agriculture and international concerted
action.

116

The Macsharry Plan would allow
years and the intervention price

the target price for cereals to

would be 10% below and

fall

35%

by

over three

the threshold price and

10%

'"id
112

id
1,3

id
114

id

15

Rudi Gotzen, EC Perspective of Production Subsidies and Control 37 Drake. L.R 23
m )id
1

1

,234

( 1

987)
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above the target
the policy
1

I

11

price.

In 1992 the Council of Agricultural Ministers formally adopted

which would over

three years control production while guaranteeing fanners'

Q

This called for price cuts, measures to control over production, and a link

income.

between subsidies and acreage. This has represented a step

no means represents a fundamental change

in the

in the right direction but

CAP policies.

The

effect

it

by

of the 1992

policy has been that the level of price support for most agricultural products have been

reduced.

119

Lee Ann Patterson. Economic and Social Committee. Reform of the
ed.3(1992)
Eric Fisher.

the

1988

Common

Aaricultural Policy

A Three Level Game Approach to Understanding Agricultural Policy
and the 1992 Macs harry Reform.

Stabilizers

in the

SI

1

EC: A study of

CHAPTER 3
Analysis of the Uruguay

From

the analysis

above

it

is

Round

of Multilateral Negotiations

observed that agricultural protectionism has hampered

trade in agricultural products as the

EC

and

US

have sought to protect their domestic

markets. Disputes have occurred as a result of agricultural subsidization and there has

been the need for constructive steps to reduce subsidies. The essence of the Uruguay

Round of Multilateral Agreements was

to establish steps to reduce restrictive activities

and encourage trade liberalization. The Uruguay Round brought trading in agricultural
products under the umbrella of GATT. The

Round Became

applicable to

granted on them.

It is

it

wanted

of rules under the Uruguay

products whether or not a tariff concession had be

interesting to observe that the United States did not initially

favour the decision to bring

system as

all

GATT Code

all

agricultural products within the confine of the

to continue to protect

analysing the elements of the

its

non

agricultural market. In this chapter

Round which have made

will be

I

significant steps to reducing

protectionism. Although these steps are designed to promote freer trade they

still

have

loopholes which can be exploited in the aim to secure restrictions to market entry.

35

tariff

36

An

A.

introduction to the

At the

start

of the Uruguay Round the effects of protectionism was being

global agricultural trade.

1

Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture

Between 1980 and 1985 world farm

1%. During that period. United States farm exports

billion to 26.1 billion dollars while

main competitor.

now watching

from a record

level

Thus the US. once the world
its

the

trade decreased by about

of 43.3

farm exports from the European Community

29.1 billion in 1981 to 26.1 billion in 1986.

of agricultural products was

fell

felt in

from

largest exporter

share of the world market decline than

its

*

The Uruguay Round Agreement contains four

parts,

one on modalities for the

establishment of specific binding commitments under the Reform Program, another on

the decision

by contracting

parties

on the application of Sanitary and Photo-sanitary

measures, and one on the declaration on measures concerning the possible negative
effects of the

It

Reform Program on

net food

- importing developing

countries.

contained specific binding commitments in three important areas- market access,

domestic support and export competition.

It

took into account the distinctive problems of

developing countries, especially the least developed countries. Article IX provides a

list

of export subsidies which shall be subject to reduction commitments. This includes the
provision by governments or their agencies of direct subsidies, consisting of payment in
kind, to a firm, industry, or producers of an agricultural product.

The

sale or disposal for export

by governments, or

"

their agencies

of non commercial

stocks of agricultural products, at a price lower than the comparable price charged for the

120
121

RE

nd

GATT Legal

System and World Trade Diplomacy. 2 ed 56 (1990 )
Jimmv Hillman, Agriculture in the Uruguay Round; A US perspective, 3 Till. L. J (1993)
Hudec. The

122

id
123

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

art.

IX, 55 U.N.T.S

like

product to buyers in the domestic market

is

also subject to reductions.

~

The

implementation period was between 1993-1999. The contracting parties undertook not
to introduce or reintroduce subsidies

on the export of agricultural products

subsidies were not granted during the base period. In addition they

commitments

to limit the

may

if

such

negotiate

scope of export subsidies granted on agricultural products

in

individual or regional markets.

A proposal was made for the

establishment of a committee on agriculture, charged

with the supervision of the operation of the agreement
the basis of the notification submitted

by the

Secretariat. Consultations

.

The review process took place on

by the contracting

parties

and documents prepared

and dispute settlement will be governed by Articles

XXII and XXIII of the General Agreement.

A third feature of the document

is

that

it

125

takes into account the special problems of

developing countries. Article 14(1) provides for special and differential treatment

in

respect of commitments. Least developed countries are not required to undertake

reduction commitments. With regards to export competition developing countries will
not be required to undertake commitments in respect of

With respect

to specific

commitments

in the areas

some of the

subsidies in

Annex

of market access, domestic support and

export competition, developing countries will have the flexibility to apply lower rates to
reduction

.

provided that the rate of reduction in each case

that specified for

124
125

Draft Final Act.

126

id

20.

(

no

less

than two thirds of

126

GATT

Doc.

MTN.TNC/W/FA

Dec.20, 1991.

Draft Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay

Dec

is

developing countries. In addition they will have an implementation

period often years.

1991) para 15(6)

7.

Round Agreement

GATT Doc.No.MTN.TNC
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B. Analysis of the Round's Provisions of the

Uruguay Round regarding

trade in

Agriculture.

The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture modifies

agricultural trade in three

principal areas. First, the agreement provides greater market access

agricultural products within the confines of

bans

all

new

GATT

limits

by bringing

on non-tariff barriers. Second,

it

export subsidies and establishes measures by which existing export

subsidies are reduced. Third,

it

requires reduction in domestic support by establishing an

aggregate measure of support for trade distorting domestic policies and by providing
1-7

timetables for specified cuts.

On December

15.

1993 parties to the Uruguay Round signed a Final Act embodying

the results of their trade negotiations.

trade organization

known

multilateral

agreement established a new world

World Trade Organization (WTO)

as the

multilateral trade system that

The

emerged from the round and

to administer the new-

to oversee the

implementations

of the substantive agreements reached in the Round. Under the Agreement on Agriculture

GATT Members would commit themselves to three basic
market access for agricultural imports,

to

measures

:

to provide greater

reduce domestic farm subsides and to reduce

export subsidies.

a)

Export subsidies
In Jeffrey Steinle's Article "

that prior to the

2

The Problem Child of World Trade Reform**

Uruguay Round,

GATT rules affecting

agricultural trade

were

129

he states

far

weaker

Miguel Figueroa The GATT and Agriculture: Past, Present and Future 5 Kan. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 93
Jeffrey Steinle, The Problem Child of World Trade: Reform School for Agriculture 15 Columb J.Eur.
L(1995)
128

129

id

than those which governed trade in industrial goods.

that contracting parties

GATT

Article

XVI. 4 "'provided

"

shall cease to grant either directly or indirectly

any form of subsidy on the export of any

product other than a primary product in which a subsidy results in the sale of such a
product for export
to buyers in the

at a price

lower than the comparable price charged for the

product

domestic market."

Essentially, the

WTO agreement on agriculture neither eliminates nor forbids exports

for agricultural products but rather

it

creates

GATT bindings

subsidies that a country can provide. Article 2.3 of

shall not provide export subsidies in excess

commitment

like

levels specified in

its

GATT

on the amount of export

""provides that

"members

of the budgetary outlay and quantity

schedule and shall not provide such subsidies in

respect of any agricultural product not specified in the section of

its

schedules".

Member

schedules are schedules calculated with reference to a formula of reductions of export
subsidies staged over a six year period, until the

commitments reach

levels

36 per cent of

budgetary support and 21 per cent in terms of export volume. The types of export
subsidies subject to reduction

commitments

forms of export subsidies are permitted

are specifically listed in the text.

at all.

commercial transactions which might be used
are forbidden

130

bv Article X.

GATT Article XVI.4

No

Moreover other forms of subsidies or non
to

circumvent export subsidy commitments

133

33 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 55 U.N.T.S 187

art

XVI:4

131

id
13

]
133

other

GATT article 2, 33 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (GATT) 19 55 U.N.T.S 187
GATT article 10. 33 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents (GATT) 19 55U.N.T.S 187
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b)

Domestic support

With regard

to

domestic support Article 2.2 of the Agreement on Agriculture

member

provides that a

shall not provide support in favor

excess of the commitment levels in

its

schedule.

1,4

of domestic producers in

The agreement does not eliminate

domestic support but rather implements a formula based approach to reductions. The

commitment

made on

is

the basis of a Total Aggregate

Aggregate Measure of Support
country for

all

agricultural

no or minimal trade

is

the

Measure of Support

.

The

measure of the domestic subsidies provided by a

commodities

,

except for support which

distorting effects, or for support

which

is

is

considered to have

tied to specific production

limiting policies.

It

quantifies

all

forms of agricultural support and creates a composite figure used as

the basis for cutbacks.

local

13

"

The

AMS also forces countries to either effect the reduction of

governmental outlays to agriculture or absorb the local outlays with greater cuts

the central government's programs.

agricultural product.

distorting countries

is

from eliminating trade

that

it

to concentrate

AMS for each individual

prevents production and trade

barriers in

one product area by imposing them

allowed to maintain agricultural policies that are more appealing

larger cuts in other less essential policies.

for this specific reason.

wanted

Countries must calculate

The advantage of it

in others. Countries are

by making

136

The United

States,

The

EU

originally advocated

was opposed such a measure and

on the elimination of export subsidies.

lj7

The

AMS

instead

AMS approach was

lj4

id
135
35

in

GATT Article

1, 33 Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 19 55 U.N.T.S 187
Kenneth E Cooper, Seeking Compliance with International Trade Agreements at the State level, 2
Minn. J. Global Trade 143, 157 (1993)
137
Peter Torday, GATT Talks Floundering in Final Phase The independent Oct 10, 1990 at 29

136

,
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ultimately adopted in the

down
c)

Uruguay Round and represents an important

stride in

breaking

agricultural protectionism,

Market access
In seeking to provide greater market access for agricultural imports, the

agreed to convert non tariff barriers into a
tariff barriers to tariffication, the

going back to any non
|

members

tariff barrier that

members

tariff equivalent. In addition to subjecting

are expressly prohibited

non

from maintaining or

they were required to convert to a tariff

TO

equivalent.

The market access provisions of the agreement mandate
border measures. Tarrification

is

tariffication

of

all

non

tariff

the replacement of non tariff barriers with tariffs that

provide an equivalent level of protection. Tariff equivalents are equal to the difference

between the world market price and the domestic price with non

The market access provisions
shall not maintain, resort to

,

require that

1

tariff barriers in place.

members

or revert to any measures of the kind

which have been

required to be converted into ordinary customs duties.

The measures
levies,

tariff

to

minimum

be converted include quantitative import restrictions, variable import
import prices and discretionary import licensing. The conversion of non

border restrictions to

tariffs signals that agricultural

products are no longer afforded

the myriad exceptions that are unavailable for manufactured goods.

The Agreement on Agriculture

140

also requires that the tariff resulting after conversion of

non-tariff barriers be reduced. Tariff reductions are based

on each country's

tariff

138

id
139

The

International Agricultural Trade Research Consortium,

Agriculture:
140

An

The Uruguay Round Agreement on

evaluation 29(Commissioned paper No. 9, 1994)

Jimmy S Hillman,

Agriculture in the Uruguay

Roundly

Tulsa

L.J.

761(1993)
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schedule, averaging a total of

level

36%

over six years for developed countries. This higher

of tariff reduction reflects the fact that developed countries account for about two

thirds

of the world's import of agricultural products. Developing countries

their tariffs at a

lower rate than developed countries. Scheduled

developing countries average
reduction

is

24%

tariff

over ten years. For individual

15%. limiting the extent

to

tariffs

on

greater protection than the original

non

tariffs,

tariff

the

minimum

protectionist

The market access

others.

requirement safeguards against trade decreases that could result

reduce

reductions for

which a country may maintain

border measures for some products by reducing

may

if tariffication creates

measure. The Agreement on Agriculture

does provide for safeguard measures that allow a member's imposition of an additional
duty on a product not to exceed one third of then current level,
imports of that product.

However

if

1

McCarthys

the tarrification of all

As

products.

GATT's

non

1

Article

tariff

imposed

"

he

states that the increased

1

market provisions with

border measures will result in a binding on agricultural

a result the security of trade in agricultural products will for the

first

time in

history be greater than in industrial products, as a hundred per cent of

With respect

to individual product

categories developed countries will cut tariffs by above average

cut tariffs

C

J.

.

-17

agricultural product tariff lines will be bound.

Alan

experiences a surge in

these rules limit the use to one year and require a

certain level of surge before an additional duty can be

In Terrence

it

amounts on

oilseeds,

and

by below average amounts on sugar and diary products. In the category of

Swan, Cases and Materials on the Regulation of International Business and Economic Relations

(\99A)
'

Terrence McCartin,

L.J 613 (1998)

WTO Subsidies enforcement bv the

US Department of Commerce,

1075 Practising
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tropical products,

which accounts

of agricultural products, a

43%

for half

of the exports of developing countries

reduction in tariffs will be implemented.

Value of imports

in

terms

{A ~

Percentage

reduction in tariff

Product categories

All sources

All agricultural products

Coffee, tea. cocoa
Oilseeds, fats and oils

Tobacco

Developing economies

84.240

38.030

37

9136

8116

35

12.584

6833

40

3086

1135

36

Spices and cereal preparations

2767

Sugar

1730

1135

36

Grains

5310

725

39

Source:

GATT

1

Secretariat. Agricultural Product

134

35

Commitment

for the

Uruguay Round

144

Export Subsidy reduction commitments bv country
(Millions of US dollars)

Export subsidies

Participant

Product composition of export

subsidies

Total

European Union

Base
13.274

Final

8496

Change
-36

Bovinemeat

(1

9%) Wheat
?

( 1

coarse

grains (13%), butter (13%).

143

Md

7%),

44

Wheat (61%) skim milk powder

-36

594

929

United States

(14%)
Source:

GATT

Secretariat:

Reduction of Export Subsidies as a result of the Uruguay

Round.

REDUCTIONS
Reduction

in

IN

DOMESTIC SUPPORT TO AGRICULTURAL PRODUCERS

domestic support to agricultural producers

(millions of US dollars)

Base

Participant

Final

Change
European Union

92.390

United States

23.879

Source:

GATT

trade liberalization. This

tariffs

is

due

the other

19.103

-20

hand can be exploited

to the fact that tariffs

The overstatement of tariffs has been

tariffication

-17

Secretariat

The market access provision on

countries.

76.903

labelled dirty tariffication.

that tariffs

l4
\
l4i

The European
for

tariffication for

some products

some

Dirty Tariffication also increases the likelihood that countries will use the

provided in reducing

tariffs to

minimize trade

liberalization.

Because

GATT Secretariat,

B.I.S.D 27th Supp 1994
Vernon Runingen, Implication of Agricultural Policy Reforms

(1989)
146

U:>

were higher than the estimated equivalents

and the United States has been known to have used dirty

flexibility

The

procedures used by a majority of countries resulted in significantly higher

Union declared

146

of

can be overstated by individual

than the estimated equivalent for the 1986-1988 base period.

products.

to the detriment

Hathaway

&

Ingco 18-19

in Industrial

Market Economies 59

45

reductions are averaged across

all

products and are not trade weighted, an incentive exists

for countries to protect sensitive products through divergent tariff reductions,

d) Export competition

The Agreement on Agriculture imposes two major requirements on export
Programs

that constitute export subsidies include

payments

subsidies.

in kind, subsidized stock

exports, producer financed export subsidies, export marketing cost subsidies, and export

specific transportation subsidies. Nations are required to reduce their existing export
14

subsidies.

country

may

Export subsidy rules are important because they cap the future subsidies a
provide for an exported product. For the

GATT there can no

first

time in the history of the

longer be any doubt as to what level of export subsidies a country can

grant in agricultural trade.

To

aid enforcement of these requirements the exporting

country has the burden of proving compliance with the reductions or prohibitions.

149

This

burden of proof should also compel governments to implement detailed reporting
procedures to establish that aid to producers

of reductions

in

is

not tied to exports.

budgetary outlays and export volumes

is

The dual requirement

extremely important. If required

reductions in export subsidies are measured only by budget percentages, then as trade
increases, smaller subsidy expenditures can subsidize greater quantities of exports.

Conversely in a shrinking product market,

if

required reductions of subsidized exports are

measured only by volume, then greater expenditures could be applied without decreasing
the quantity of subsidized exports.

N

Stefan Tangermann,

149

"

An Assessment of the Agreement on Agriculture

in Organisation for Economics
World Trading System: Readings 143. 145 (1994)
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. VIII 55 U.N.T.S 187
Michael Tracy, The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 4 Minn J. Global Trade 333 at 352

Co-operation and Development. The
148

1

(1996)
150

id
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,
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C.

Weakness and Enforcement
The degree of trade

Difficulties of the Provisions

liberalization afforded

been significantly weakened by
difficulty is the effect

by the reductions

in

domestic support has

difficulties in enforcing the reductions.

The

first

of numerous exceptions within the agreement. The second

is

the

complexity of implementing the provisions and the political incentive for continuing
support.

The

third

is

the inability of the

Green Box exceptions may also

limit

WTO to enforce the provisions in the agreement.

meaningful reduction of domestic support. Political

inertia also creates the incentive to preserve

are concerned with the effects of disrupting

cutting subsidies

farm lobbies.

1

"

1

and politicians loathe

Also, there

is

more

trade distortive measures. Legislators

employment

to detract

in the agricultural sector

by

from farmers and upset the powerful

a lack of reporting and verification procedures. Currently

there are no procedures in place

by which a team of experts can audit

agricultural support

programs of individual countries.

'

Thomas

Hertel,

PSEs and the Mix of Measures

to

Support Farm Incomes. 12 World Econ. 17 22 (1989,/
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CHAPTER 4
Multilateral

Trade Agreements and Developing Countries

This chapter discusses the effect of protectionist policies of the United States and

US

European Community on developing countries. The

and

EC

are the

two major

markets which can pull developing countries out of balance of payments

difficulties.

Increased access to these markets by developing countries in relation to the unrestricted

sale

of agricultural products will encourage the development of third world economies.

Developing countries have had to forge special relationships with the
to obtain favourable

market access. However

against other developing countries.

The

in

and

EC

in order

been on the basis of discrimination

resulting effect has

group of developing countries over another
It is

this has

US

breach of

been the favouring of one

GATT

principles.

important to emphasize that developing countries are economically small

compared

to

developed countries and their leverage

in global negotiations is

correspondingly limited. In addition exports by individual countries are often
concentrated on a few product lines so that there

in

is

typically substantially

more

volatility

developing country terms of trade compared to developed countries.

Developing countries have long
For

many

felt that

they had

little

influence in

years developing countries pressed for special treatment in

attempted to create

new

rules to

embody

their concept

47

GATT decisions.

GATT and

of how the world economy should

48

operate. In 1984 a

tarrif barriers

GATT

sponsored group of experts noted the adverse effect that non

were having on developing country exports and called

for their

reduction.

The General Agreement contains

several provisions that explicitly allow differential

and more favourable treatment for developing countries. These provisions are Article
XVIII, XXVIII and XXXVIII. General clauses in the agreement also favour developing
countries. Article

II

requires

schedule of that member.

Many

schedules or no schedules at

for

GATT members to limit tariffs to the binding

all

any imported goods as they

GATT rules for countries

listed in the

developing countries have historically had very short

and have been relatively
desire.

free to use

Furthermore there

with balance of payment

is

any level of tariffs

an important exception to

difficulties.

Many

developing

countries have chronic balance of payments difficulties and therefore have constant

access to the privileges of this exception.

15

A. The Decision on Most Favourable Nation Treatment.

3

Following negotiations within the framework of the Multilateral Trade Negotiations
the contracting parties decided as follows:

a)

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article

parties

may

1

of the General Agreement

without according such treatment to other contracting parties.
b)

The provisions of paragraph
i.

,

contracting

accord differential and more favourable treatment to developing countries

'a'

apply to the following

preferential tariff treatment accorded

1

"

:

by developed contracting parties to products
System of

originating in developing countries in accordance the Generalized

Preferences,

1

"

John Jackson World Trade and the law of GATT, Trade policies for a better future (Report of Eminent

Persons on Problems facing the International trading system.) 22 (1969)
133
154

id

Abdulqawi

A

Yusu//4 Journal of World Trade law 488; 26 th Supp. BISD 203 (1980J

155

id

48

49

and more favourable treatment with respect to the provisions of the
General Agreement concerning non tarrif measures governed by the provisions of
instruments multilaterally negotiated under the auspices of the GATT;
ii.

differential

amongst less developed contracting
parties for the mutual reduction or elimination of tariffs and in accordance with criteria or
conditions which may be prescribed by the contracting parties for the mutual reduction or
elimination of non tariff measures on products imported from one another;
special treatment of the least developed among the developing countries in the context of
any general or specific measures in favour of developing countries,
c) Any differential and more favourable treatment provided under this clause shall be
designed to facilitate and promote the trade of developing countries and not to raise
barriers or to create undue difficulties for the trade of any other contracting parties.
i. Any differential and more favourable treatment shall not constitute
an impediment
to the reduction or elimination of tariff and other restrictions to trade on a Most Favoured
regional or global arrangements entered into

iii.

Nation basis;
of such treatment accorded by developed contracting parties to
developing countries be designed and if necessary modified to respond positively to the
ii.

shall in the case

1

"

7

development financial and trade needs of developing countries.
d. The developed countries do not expect reciprocity for commitments made by them in
trade negotiations to reduce or remove tariffs and other barriers to trade of developing
,

countries

B.

.

The Generalized System of Preferences

The

GATT contracting parties

authorized the creation of the Generalized System of

Preferences by a waiver adopted in 1971

extend

it

was eliminated by

the 1979

The waiver was

.

for ten years but the need to

GATT decision on differential

treatment for developing countries. The idea

was

that the

and more favourable

promotion of developing

countries' exports of manufactured products could help free those countries

dependence on trade

in

primary products

,

from heavy

whose slow long term growth and marked

price instability contributed to chronic trade deficits.

By

adopting a deliberate policy of

export oriented industrialization, developing countries could benefit not only from

employment and production

156

id

ir

id

creation, but also

from greater export earning potential based

50

on products

for

which demand was

1:>8

strong.

To

attain these goals

however only the

markets of the industrialized countries appeared large enough to provide the desired

growth stimulus.

The solution was the creation of a system of generalized non

reciprocal preferences

under which developed countries would lower the customs duties they assessed on

goods imported from developing countries.
in the

home

It

followed from that in addition to protection

market.' developing country producers also

needed preferential access

to

developed country markets to offset their poor export prospects. This led to the
establishment of the Generalized System of Preferences which became a central element

in the call for special

Through

this

and

differential treatment for

developing countries in the

GATT. 160

approach producers in the developing countries would benefit from a price

advantage over other foreign producers whose goods would benefit from a price
advantage over other foreign producers, whose goods would continue to
the normal rates.

At the same time developing country producers would be able

compete on more equal terms with domestic producers
It

attract

in importing countries.

duty

at

to

'

has proved difficult to assess the actual effects of the Generalized System of

Preferences due to the unavailability of relevant statistics and the problem of isolating
the Generalized

System of Preference from other factors influencing the overall growth

of developing countries

.

McMahon, Agricultural

trade, protectionism and the problems of development 258 (1992)
The GATT Uruguay Round Effects on Developing Countries 63 (1991)
160
The GSP was authorized by the Contracting Parties under Article XXV of the GATT and it took the
form of a temporary waiver of GATT obligations for qualifying developing states. Generalized System of
th
Preferences, Decision of the Contracting Parties, June 25, GATT BISD, 18 Supp. (1972)

Joseph

/J9

161

Sheila Page.

id

51

Under

the

GSP

developing country benefits have been eroded by multilateral

reductions under the

limitations.

GATT.

Firstly, the

GSP schemes impose

Also annual review by the President of the

product exclusions. Secondly the system

needed for long term planning

quantitative and country

results in annual country or

frequently modified and lack the stability

EC

developing countries. The

in

may

quotas annually and hence

is

US

tariff

easily discontinue benefits.

modifies

its

ceilings and

There are also numerous

exclusions in the provisions of the Generalized System of Preferences.

C.

The Paradox of the Agreement on Agriculture
In Michelle Gravelle's article she states that although the

significant inroads to

promoting

free trade there are negative effects arising out

While the Uruguay Round aimed
other hand

light

to liberalize trade

made proposals which could be

by developing countries

.

by reducing protectionism,

On the

it

on the

liberalization

is

observed in the

one hand global trade will be advanced with

However on

the limitation of restrictive policies.

of it.

detrimental to the source of income obtained

The complex nature of trade

of concessionary agreements.

restrictive policies

Uruguay Round has made

the other

hand

it is

which has enabled many developing countries

through similar

to obtain a constant

and

guaranteed source of income. Trade liberalization therefore has to be carefully construed
1

in relation to

developing countries.

f\A

During the Uruguay Round there was a

African participation and developing countries weakened their joint
treatment in the system, and participated in

"

lot

of

call for special

ways which they previously had

not.

John Jackson, Legal Problems of International Economic Relations (1995)
Michelle Gravelle, Symposium SocialJustice and Development- Critical issues facing the Bretton
Woods System. Africa and the Uruguay Round 6 Transnat'L&Contemp. Probs 123 (1996)
:
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According

to the prevailing

Round on African
indeed nearly

tariff

all

view the

countries

is

first

potentially negative effect of the

Uruguay

preference erosion. The majority of African countries and

the sub Saharan African countries, participate in various preferential

schemes which give them margins of

tariff

preferences in their markets through the

Generalized System of Preference. In the European
l6 ~

by the Lome Convention.

Community

These preferences allow a reduced

the

GSP

is

supplemented

tariff rate to

apply to

exported products from qualifying African Caribbean and Pacific countries, creating a
benefit for these qualifying countries. Preference erosions resulting

round produces trade losses of about 7.5million
occurring in the EU.

dollars,

from the Uruguay

with a loss of about 5.4million

166

A second potentially negative effect identified in the debate over the effects of the
Uruguay Round on Africa

number of African

is

countries.

agreed to in the Uruguay

the effect on the food importing countries

Here the contention

Round

is

that as a result

which include a

of the

new

disciplines

there will be a reduction in the levels of support paid to

farm communities in the industrialized

states, particularly in

Europe.

As

a result

agricultural food prices will rise globally, reflecting reductions in production subsidies

covering both explicit production subsidies, price supports, and export subsidies.

view these arrangements and subsidies as the reason

low food prices

for net food importing countries.

for increases in supply

The contention

is

-

Mam-

and relatively

that agricultural

Jack Chen, Going Bananas: How the WTO can heal the split in the Global Banana Trade Dispute 63
Fordham.L.Rev 1283(1995)
3
John Jackson. Problems of International Economic Relations 1 130-3 1 (1990); 29 I.L.M 783
Peter Madden, Winners and Losers: The impact of the G ATT Uruguay Round on Developing countries.

(1993)
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production in key exporting countries will

fall,

export subsidization will be reduced and

there will be a global increase in food prices.

Another contention

Round has been

is

that the extent

relatively small

and the

of agricultural liberalization
tarrification process in

some

in the

cases has actually

resulted in increased trade barriers for certain products in certain markets.

is

that along with agricultural liberalization in the

Uruguay

The argument

developed countries comes agricultural

policy discipline in developing countries, which will improve their situation through the

elimination of domestic price distortions and changes in domestic pricing

arrangements.

D. The

168

Lome Convention

The Lome Convention

is

a multilateral trade agreement which provides preferential

treatment for African. Caribbean and Pacific countries. Tariff preferences agreed upon
are a central feature of the

Lome

convention and there are protocols for products which

include rice, sugar, beef. veal. rum. and bananas.

the

Lome Convention

The concessionary arrangement under

are important for particular African Countries.

Under these

arrangements a quota operates under which beneficiary countries ship limited amounts of
products into European markets for which they receive close to domestic prices in

Europe, which often nearly double the world prices.
In the case of sugar the

at

EU

undertakes to purchase specific quantities of cane sugar

guaranteed prices. Under Protocol 7 to the

customs

duties, applicable to

Lome Convention

beef and veal originating in the

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 33 I.L.M

1

import duties other than

ACP

144(1994;

countries are reduced

54

by ninety per

cent.

The reduction

specified quantities of boneless

in

import duties applies to exports to the

meat per calendar year

The Lome Convention departs from the

EU

of

for several African Countries.

principle of reciprocity

17

which has been a

hallmark of the earlier agreements. There are no requirements for reverse preference in
the

Lome Agreement.

goods and

Products originating in the

community

textiles enter the
171

EEC Common Agricultural

rum

states including

customs duties and

free of

Policy

25%

/2
.'

over

Quotas have been extended for

Lome

III

Mechanisms

Where

during the off-season in Europe.

the

CAP

agricultural import.

very liberal provisions for
has been negative.
countries from

20%

ACP

suppliers of

ACP

ACP

and sorghum, particularly

products are duty

-7->

Notwithstanding the

free.

exports to the Community, the trend in

There has been a decline of EEC imports from
in

beef and veal

imposes a duty, but no quantitative
i

on

ACP

are also available for the admission of certain important

agricultural products such as strawberries, tomatoes, molassess

restriction

most instances

allowances. Quotas for bananas, sugar, and

are also in place designed to protect traditional markets for the

these products.

in

manufactured

Certain agricultural products are excluded consistent with

quantitative restrictions.

with an increase of almost

ACP

1975 to

15%

in 1987.

all

ACP /EEC

trade

developing

175

The introduction and gradual extension of the Community's General System of
Preferences has considerably eroded

ACP

preferences. Indeed only about a third of ACP

68

Alexander Yeats, What are OECD Trade Preferences worth to Africa
ed 71 (1994)
The Lome Convention, Protocol 8 Containing theText of Protocol 3 on ACP Sugar, 12, 29 I.L.Mat 899
Joseph McMahon Agricultural Trade, protectionism and the problem of development, 1992
171
Lome Convention IV Article 68& 69 29 I.L.M 899
SI

1

,<5y

1

1

172

id

m id
and Social problems of Africa South of the Sahara 1991
Watkins Africa and the EC: The Lome Conventions, The Courier, NO. 121 May-june 1991
Williams, Political
J

,
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products, primarily agricultural produce and fish enjoy real advantages due to the

preferences.

The remaining two

thirds

would

enter duty free in any event.

must compete with other developing countries

The

products.

the

Lome

ACP

countries have

IV. noting that

it

is

made

the

in the

EEC

markets for these

Community comply with

countries

GSP

article

XXIX

in

conscious of the need to ensure the overall application of

the convention and the maintenance of the competitive position of the

their

ACP

Lome

ACP

states

where

advantages to the Community market are affected by measures relating to general

trade liberalization.
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The Banana Trade War

E.

The Banana Dispute

illustrates

protectionism by both the United States and the

European Community and how the principles of GATT have been breached
achievement of protectionist measures.

do not have any significant

It is

interesting to note that both the

in the

EC

interest in Africa in particular but are protecting the

and

US

markets

for their respective multinational corporate clients.

Since 1988 the
nearly

in the

40%
EC

EC

has been the world's largest importer of bananas credited with

of the global banana market. In 1991 the cumulative volume of fresh bananas

neared 3.63 million tons of which Latin American countries produced two

thirds of the total. In

1992 the

total

supply of bananas in the

EC

market approximated

3.76 million tons of bananas of which Latin American countries provided 2.4 million
tons and

ACP countries provided around

Fifty First Session

Jan

of the

0.69million tons.

ACP Council of Ministers:

177

Seeking satisfaction on Trade, The Courier no 125

-Feb 1991

GA TT Dispute Settlement Panel Report -

Import Regime for Bananas 34 I.L.M

1

77, 1 85

( 1

995)

56

In 1993 the

settling

in the

European Union

after five years

of procrastination made an attempt

what had become a complex and thorny issue of how

at

banana trade

to regulate the

Union. The problem was that some members imported bananas solely from their

former colonies in order to guarantee those developing countries a market for their
bananas. Meanwhile other countries

who were

not bound to former colonies bought

cheaper bananas from Latin American producers

bananas industries.

Convention also guarantees

access to bananas under the treaty of Rome and the

territories

regard to their banana exports. The

most favored nation

EU

obligations under

countries.

The

to

GATT meant that the

American banana countries would be given

status in regards to trade with the

deny preferential treatment

any country

at the

EU.

GATT therefore

effect of this

would be

ACP nations whose main
However the

that

ACP

expense of Latin American

EU agreed

This would be devastating to a

lost.

source of income

to

is

rules that took effect in 1993.

same time honoring

African, Caribbean and Pacific countries that banana exports

Europe. In order to honour

its

that

uniformly enforces

commitments

European Council Regulation 404/93,

art 12,

lot

of the

derived from the trade in bananas.

new banana import

was a new banana regime

would be displaced and

countries economies

regulating the banana market while at the

178

obligated the

179

hundreds of thousands of jobs would be

result

Lome

and former colonies preferential treatment with

contracting parties, including the five Latin

to

cost efficient

17

Germany had unimpeded

EC

who had modern and

to the

ACP

1993 O.J (L47)

its

It

commitment

would be

all tariffs

reconciled

to the

protected.

The

and quotas throughout

banana producing countries, the

57

new regime

allows duty free importation up to

30%

of all European banana consumption.

Latin American bananas on the other hand which are cheaper are limited to

tons per year with a

20% tariff.

Anything above

This measure was to prevent devastation of the

170%

this level is subject to

AC?

two million
1

80

tariff.

economies which heavily

rely

on the

European banana market.

The Latin American Countries reacted
implement a dispute panel

to investigate

to the

new

regime. They called on

and rule on the

legality of the

new banana

regime. The Latin American countries argued that the EU"s banana regime

incompatible with

was

GATT and discriminatory.

In an attempt to head of the

countries a

GATT to

compromise

200,000 ton increase

in

offer.

GATT panel

The

report the

EU made

the Latin

American

offer consisted of a 100,000 ton increase in

1994 and a

1995 over the original two million annual quota. The offer was

non negotiable and conditional on the Latin American producers dropping the ongoing

GATT

dispute prior to release of the Second Panel report.

However some of the

countries

refused and the compromise dissolved.

The second report
to the dire political

EU opened

179

to
181

its

criticized the

EC who

argued that the report was unacceptable due

and economic consequences

market to

less

it

would cause

the

expensive Latin American Bananas.

ACP

It

countries if the

argued that

its

GATT, Basic Instruments and Selected Documents 1-78(1969), at l;61Stat. All, T.I.A.S No 1700,
Bruce Barnard and Miriam Widman, Court Backs EC Controls on Latin Bananas; Germans Say Curbs
Hike Prices, Unemployment ,J. COM., June 30, 1993
4

Nathaniel Shepperd, Expected

Add Stiff Tariffs

,

J.

COMM.,

Banana Export Boom Turns

(1993)

into Bust for Central

America;

EC Quotas

58

commitments
its

1.

to the

back on the

ACP

ACP

countries.

The African Caribbean and
These are sixty nine

Lome

Convention. The

colonial status. For

their

economic and

in

Lome Convention do

countries under the

it

to turn

182

Pacific countries

number. These countries' trade with the

EU

not permit

grants

them

preferential trading status

most of these developing nations
political survival.

Of these

this

EU
due

arrangement

is

governed by the

to their

is

former

important to

sixty nine countries at least eight

Caribbean and African countries are considered to have significant banana producing
industries.

dTvoire,

They

are Belize, Dominica, St Lucia, St Vincent, Grenada, Jamaica. Cote

Cameroon and Somalia.

consumed by

the

EU came from ACP
1

figure has

2.

Prior to the

dropped

to

o

and

EU

new banana regime 46% of the bananas
territories but

under the

new regime

this

}

30%.

The Latin American countries
These countries have industrial efficiency

ACP

in

banana production. Compared

countries they have larger farms and lower costs of production.

to the

The banana

producing countries are Columbia, Venezuela. Costa Rica. Guatemala, Nicaragua,

Honduras. Panama and Ecudor.

Of these

primary source of income and economic
disparity of Latin

American production

eight the first five are

stability are

Industry.

Due

derived from bananas.

costs with the

by multinational corporations from the United States
to the significant investment

GATT members and the

ACP

is

due to

in the Latin

However

the

capital investments

American Banana

and the traditional presence of those

59

multinationals. Latin

significantly

3.

more

The United

America plantations

efficient.

larger than those of the

Consequently the cost of production

is

ACP

and

considerably

less.

States involvement

Until September 2.

At

much

are

that time. Chiquita

1

994 the United States had refrained from entering the banana war.

Brands International

two major American owned multinational

Inc.

and Hawaii Banana Industry Association,

enterprises, filed a petition under Section 301

of the 1974 Trade Act with the United States Trade Representatives. Section 301
authorizes the executive branch to retaliate against practices of another country that are

considered unfair in trade and commerce, thereby adversely affecting
those of its nationals. United States nationals

may

petition the

US

interests

government

investigatory proceedings of a country's trade practices under Section 301

to initiate

.

Many

countries have strongly criticized section301 because the President through the

may

retaliate

even where there

is

no showing

international agreement. Additionally.

any regard
(a)

GATT/WTO

to the

U.S

that the alleged offense violates

officials

authorities or to

of the Trade Act authorizes the

USTR to

US

may impose

The

US

USTR

any

international obligations. Section

302

investigate acts, policies and practices of a

US

as defined in section 301.

cited

GATT Article

of non traditional

182

foreign

these sanctions without

foreign country that are unreasonable or discriminator) and burden or restrict

commerce

and

ACP

1:1 as

a prohibition against the EC's duty free treatment

bananas. Article

1

was

also cited as a prohibition against

Alison Maitland, Commissioner Rejects Gatt Attack on EL' Banana Regime, FIN.
Feb 23. 1994
183
Miriam Widman, Banana Ban Hurts Ports. J. COM., Sept. 20, 1993

TIMES LIMITED.

60
discrimination.

The

US

rested

its

challenge on Article XIII which covers non

discriminator}' administration of quantitative restriction. This article generally

that a

GATT member which justifiably employs tarrif quotas may do

not administer the quota scheme in a discriminatory manner.

the

US

asserted that the

EC

's tarrif

distribution principle. In support of

In

so provided

brief to the

its

it

does

WTO

offended the equitable market access

quota

its

"

mandates

US

argument the

stated that while Article XIII

does not prevent a country from providing allocations to countries that do not meet the
substantial interest criteria,

it

underscores that any quota allocations must conform with

GATT members would have

reasonable expectations that

the absence of such import restrictions

The US claimed

that the

companies by undermining
the regime.

The

US

regarding their market shares in

.

EC's actions has injured American banana marketing
their ability to obtain the

market share they enjoyed prior

attributed this diminution of access into the

EC

to

market to

discriminatory treatment of Latin America Banana producing countries in favour of ACP

countries.

However

the

standing in a dispute.

profitability

It

US, despite
seems

its

that the

array of legal allegations does not fully have

US's

sole objective

was

to secure the continued

of American multinationals and had no legitimate concerns for the Latin

American nations involved.
In 1994 Chiquita Brands International. Hawaiian

Dole Foods who produce

,

distribute

parent companies or through their

Canute James, U.S Position on

Banana Industry Association and

and market bananas through

owned and

their

US

controlled subsidiary entitites

EC Banana Quotas Angers Leaders

incorporated

summoned

of Caribbean Nations,

J.

COM

July 1993
185

First

Submission of the United States of America

Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, 1996

in

European Communities- Regime for the
397092 (GATT), PP 7,
(July 9, 1996;

WL

1

1

.,
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the

government's intervention by alleging their inability to handle the same or larger

US

volume of bananas
import regime.
the

US

under

187

its

for marketing

On the

own

and distribution services as a

laws, must demonstrate that

it

US

banana

EC,

has interest in the assertion of its

wrong. In doing so

it

must show

suffered a concrete and particularized injury in fact as a result of the
188

EC

basis of the violations the United States alleged against the

legal right to seek redress for the alleged

regime.

of the

result

EC

that

it

has

banana

firms undeniably suffered injury but relief must not be sought under the

cover of restrictions against Latin American countries. The injuries to which the United
States point undoubtedly affect

US

based parent firms and

US owned

subsidiaries in

Latin America and Europe that engage in the production, distribution and marketing of
Latin American bananas to the

EC

market. According to Article

I.

the rights that arose

out of negotiated trade concessions in bananas correspond to those countries that not only

produce bananas but also export them from within their
injured the banana trade expectations of these Latin

afford the bananas

accorded to other

which originated

GATT

and non

territory.

The EC

irrefutably

American countries by

failing to

in these territories treatment as favourable as

GATT members.

Therefore the Latin American third

countries are each logical claimants to injury resulting from a violation that impairs their

ability to export their

The

injuries alleged

United States alleges
States

186

home- grown bananas.

is

by these third countries are entirely different from the

its

firms' marketing

not complaining about

its

injuries the

and distributing services incurred. The United

restricted ability to

produce and export

US grown

P75
idatP140
id at

187
188

Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife 504 U.S 555, 560 (1992)
Legal Problems of Int'l Economic Relations: Cases, Materials and Text32 (1995;

John Jackson

,

62

bananas and so

it

cannot rely on the protection of Article

of injury' resulting from an infringement on
foreign territory

is

misplaced.

From

its

US

GATT.

of

In effect

bananas grown

ability to export

this perspective the

standing to seek relief for injuries that

1

its

claim

in a

United States does not have

firms suffered under

GATT

in terms

of trade in

goods.

4.

Recent developments in the Banana Trade dispute.

Although the United States did not have

100%

tariffs

on 200 million

dollars worth of

legal standing

EU

decision on European Union banana import rules

precedent in other trade disputes.

set

agreed with the

US

that

US

new EU banana

the panel significantly lowered the

is

got a go-ahead to impose

imports on April

was seen

as a

trade officials said a

6.

1999.

The

major victory

WTO

that could

WTO arbitration panel

import rules violate international trade laws. But

amount of sanctions sought by

United States originally claimed $520 million

EU

it

in lost trade

due

to

the

EU

US

in the case.

banana

rules.

The

The

the biggest banana market, estimated to be worth five billion dollars a year at the
190

retail level.

The United
restrictions

States

won

a trade dispute

on banana producing economies but rather a trade war

various multinational companies

for the nine

dollars.

190

which had not been about the

who

months ended October

effect

of quota

in the interest

of the

trade in the product. Chiquita Brands international,

30. 1998. net sales increased

Net income applicable increased

http:cnnfn/hotstories/washun/9901/22/banana/

61% to

14%

70.3 million dollars.

to 2.09 billion

Revenues

reflect

63

the expansion of the vegetable canning operations through acquisitions. This

company

that

Similarly.

employs 40.000 people with a market cap of 674.66 million

Dole Food Company

is

engaged

in the

worldwide

to 3.39 billion dollars.
192

dollars.

191

id

It

a
191

dollars.

distributing, processing.

sourcing and marketing of growing branded good products including fresh
vegetables, and almonds. For the forty

is

weeks ended October

10,

fruits.

1998 revenues rose

employs 44.000 and has a market cap of 1.729.10million

4%

CONCLUSION
trade in agricultural products has over the years been subjected to trade

The global
policies

been

which have been

that

restrictive in nature. The

predominant agricultural markets have

of the United States and European Community. They account for two thirds of

the total global trade in agriculture.

The United

States

and the European Community have

had border measures which have inhibited the progress of agricultural
measures have been utilized

to protect their respective

trade.

These border

domestic markets. Methods have

included variable duty rates and quantitative restrictions.
Protectionist trade policies have not only

in violation

law

to

of the

promote

GATT rules.

The

been economically detrimental but have been

principles of

GATT were enacted

free trade in agricultural products but

some of the

in international

principles involved

have been disregarded in the desire to protect domestic markets. Over the years the United
States and the

European Community has engaged

in several protectionist

conducts which

has lead to the principles being rendered ineffective.

Developing countries are economically smaller than developed countries and
ability to negotiate effectively for their regions has

countries have had access to

non

encountered trade restrictions

reciprocal

among which

their

been limited. Although developing

Most Favourable Nation Treatment they have
are variable levies and quantitative

restrictions.

64

65

The

effect of protectionism

by the United States and Europe on developing countries

has been that trade in agricultural products from developing countries has not been

extremely progressive. Instead

we have

seen the violation of GATT rules through illegal

discrimation of one group of developing countries against another. Policies of the United

States

and Europe have therefore hindered the growth

The reforms
the

aim

instituted

in

world trade.

by the Uruguay Round Agreement have been very important

to liberalize global trade in agriculture.

in

The Uruguay Round has reduced the

growth of agricultural protectionism. The market access and export subsidy provisions
have provided means to reduce protectionist measures in the agricultural

trade.

The

United States and European Union should continue to reduce restrictive and protectionist
practices

which

stifles the

promoting efficiency

advancement of trade and instead

in the global trade in agricultural.

Uruguay Round Agreements

redirect

With the

full

its

resources to

compliance of the

protectionist trade policies will be limited and

prosperity will be available for

all.

economic

.
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